Realism, Feminism and the Russia-Ukraine War: Competing Visions of Security and Violence

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has become one of the defining events of contemporary world politics, raising questions about great-power rivalry, security, and the human costs of war. International relations theory offers different ways of making sense of this conflict, each foregrounding particular actors, processes and forms of violence. Classical realism presents itself as a historically grounded theory of politics that helps decision-makers navigate an uncertain and dangerous world, stressing anarchy, power, and the tragic nature of statecraft (Williams, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., pp. 55–57, 64–65). Feminist international relations, by contrast, emerged out of dissatisfaction with the gender-blindness of mainstream IR and insists that no subject matter in global politics can be understood without attention to gendered hierarchies and everyday lives (Sjoberg & Tickner, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., pp. 209–211, 214). Taken together, these perspectives exemplify the idea, central to this module, that theories are not neutral mirrors of reality but visions of world politics that highlight some features while obscuring others.

This essay brings these two visions of world politics into conversation through the case of the Russia-Ukraine war. Classical realism has already been used to interpret the conflict in terms of post-Cold War security arrangements, great-power status, and the dangers of miscalculation (Williams, pp. 68–69). Feminist IR scholars, for their part, read the same war as a gendered security phenomenon, highlighting multiple forms of violence, the differential impacts on women, children and other marginalised groups, and the role of militarised masculinities in Russian and Ukrainian politics (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 217–221).

The central question guiding the essay is: How do classical realism and feminist international relations offer different understandings of the Russia-Ukraine war, and what do these differences reveal about the limits of each approach? The argument advanced here is that classical realism provides a powerful account of the strategic, great-power dimensions of the conflict, but largely sidelines gendered experiences and everyday insecurities, while feminist IR successfully broadens what counts as war and security but engages less directly with the structural logic of great-power rivalry.

The essay proceeds in four steps: the first section outlines a classical realist reading of the war, the second develops a feminist reading, the third compares and evaluates the two approaches, and the conclusion reflects on what this comparison suggests about the value and limits of each theory for understanding contemporary world politics.

Classical Realism and the Russia-Ukraine War

Core assumptions of classical realism

Classical realism is presented by Williams not as “common sense” but as a historically grounded theory of politics that helps us think about an uncertain and dangerous world (Williams, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., pp. 55–56). It starts from the condition of anarchy in the international system: there is no overarching authority above states, so questions of survival and security become matters of “self-help”, and power is central (Williams, pp. 56–57). Realists therefore treat politics as inescapably bound up with power and interest, understood in both material and symbolic terms, capabilities, but also prestige, status and recognition (Williams, pp. 63–64).

Classical realism also develops a particular view of human nature. Rather than assuming that people are simply evil, it stresses fear, the search for security, the desire for honour and recognition, and the dangers of hubris, or overconfidence (Williams, pp. 57–59). These traits are reflected in the behaviour of states, especially great powers. This focus on fear, interest and the limits of human rationality resonates with broader classical realist debates on human nature (Freyberg-Inan, 2004; Morgenthau, 1948). Finally, the approach is explicitly state-centred: the state is treated as the key moral and political actor, responsible for the survival of a particular community and entitled, in some circumstances, to prioritise national interest over other values (Williams, pp. 60–63). Together, these assumptions generate a view of international politics as structurally conflictual and often tragic, in which even well-intentioned leaders face hard choices and may be driven into harmful courses of action (Williams, pp. 64–65).

Classical realist interpretations of the causes of the war

Applied to the Russia-Ukraine war, classical realism directs attention to the post-Cold War European security order, great-power status, and the misjudgements of political leaders. Williams notes that the conflict has often been read through realist lenses, including Mearsheimer’s structural argument that NATO enlargement and Western policy made the crisis “the West’s fault” (Williams, p. 68). Classical realists, he suggests, might share the concern that great powers react strongly to perceived encirclement, but would criticise a purely structural explanation. From a classical realist perspective, the war reflects failures of statecraft after 1991, above all the inability to integrate Russia into a stable security framework and to manage its fears and ambitions prudently (Williams, p. 68).

The approach also highlights Russia’s quest for status and recognition as a great power, and its resentment at what it perceives as marginalisation by the West (Williams, pp. 58, 68–69). Domestic politics matters too: the increasingly authoritarian and nationalist character of the Russian regime shaped how Western actions were interpreted and what responses were considered acceptable (Williams, p. 69). Finally, the decision to invade in 2022 can be read through the theme of hubris: overconfidence in Russian military capabilities and underestimation of Ukrainian resistance and Western cohesion (Williams, p. 69). The war thus appears as a risky and miscalculated attempt to revise the regional order, rather than an automatic product of systemic pressures alone.

Classical realism on the conduct and outcomes of the war

Classical realism also frames how we think about the conduct and possible settlements of the war. Williams underlines that realists are concerned with the kinds of political orders that can emerge from conflict and with the prudent management of risks, especially when nuclear powers are involved (Williams, p. 69). Any realistic settlement must take seriously the interests and power of the key actors, Russia, Ukraine and Western states, and avoid pushing any side into a position where escalation becomes likely (Williams, pp. 64–65, 69).

There is, however, no single “realist” policy line: some realists favour robust support for Ukraine to defend sovereignty and deter future aggression; others emphasise the need for accommodation with Russia as a great power (Williams, pp. 69–70). What unites them is an insistence on prudence, attention to power realities, and the tragic possibility that no outcome will be morally satisfactory. This state-centred, high-politics reading is powerful in explaining why the war occurred and why it is so difficult to end, but, as the feminist discussion will show, it largely sidelines the gendered and everyday dimensions of insecurity that the conflict produces.

Overall, seen from a classical realist perspective, the Russia-Ukraine war appears as a tragic but intelligible episode of great-power politics under anarchy, driven by security concerns, status ambitions and misjudgements of power.

Feminist IR and the Russia-Ukraine War

Core commitments of feminist international relations

Sjoberg presents feminisms in IR as emerging in the late 1980s and early 1990s out of dissatisfaction with the gender-blindness of mainstream international relations theory (Sjoberg & Tickner, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., p. 209). Feminist scholars argued that no subject matter in global politics can be adequately understood without taking gender into account and that the discipline itself is structured by gendered exclusions and hierarchies (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 209–210). Feminist critiques of IR have long argued that ignoring gendered hierarchies produces systematically partial accounts of world politics (Tickner, 1992; Enloe, 2014; Youngs, 2004). For them, “putting on gendered lenses” means asking how ideas about masculinity and femininity shape political practices and how global politics affects differently situated people in gendered ways (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 210).

A central claim is that gender is socially constructed rather than a simple reflection of biological sex. Sjoberg notes that characteristics such as strength, rationality, independence and public authority are culturally associated with masculinity, while emotion, care and the private sphere are associated with femininity; these pairings structure both domestic and international politics (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 211). Foreign policies are often legitimated in terms of “hegemonic masculinity”, presenting states as rational protectors of vulnerable populations (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 211). Feminist IR therefore treats individual lives and everyday practices as part of global politics, not as separate from “high politics” (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 210, 214).

Feminist re-conceptualisations of security and war

These commitments lead feminist scholars to rethink what security and war mean. Sjoberg argues that traditional IR approaches to security are too narrow because they treat the state as a coherent, unitary actor whose security can be read off from territorial integrity and military capabilities (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 215). Feminists contest this picture: states are made up of different groups with conflicting interests, and state decisions are shaped by affect, emotion and gendered expectations rather than by pure rational calculation (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 215).

Looking through gender lenses also reveals that security is multidimensional. People and communities can be secure or insecure physically, emotionally, economically, culturally and environmentally, and these forms of security do not always align with the security of the state (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 216). Feminist research has traced how structural violence, gender subordination and militarised social orders generate insecurity for those at the margins of states, including women workers, domestic servants and queer people (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 216–217). From this perspective, war is not only a discrete episode of armed conflict between states but part of a wider continuum of violences that runs through everyday life.

Feminist readings of the Russia-Ukraine war

Applied to the Russia-Ukraine war, these feminist insights reorient how the conflict can be analysed. While a range of IR theories illuminate particular dimensions of the war, from realist accounts of power politics to liberal analyses of institutions, a feminist lens foregrounds questions about whose experiences are centred, how violence is distributed, and how these effects are structured by gender and sexuality (Sjoberg & Tickner, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., p. 218).

A first strand of feminist analysis focuses on the multiple forms of violence produced by the war. Beyond battlefield casualties, the conflict has generated extensive displacement, economic hardship, shortages of food and medical care, and political repression in both Ukraine and Russia; these harms fall disproportionately on low-income people, women, children and the elderly (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 218). Feminists also highlight conflict-related sexual violence and the gendered burden of unpaid care work as families cope with mobilisation, injury and flight (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 218–220).

A second strand examines gendered discourses and militarised masculinities. Feminist scholars analyse how both sides use gendered imagery in their rhetoric, for example, expectations that men fight while women care for families, the Ukrainian ban on most men leaving the country, and the representation of leaders such as Putin and Zelensky through competing models of masculinity (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 219). Homophobic politics in Russia and appeals to “real man” leadership in Ukraine and Western media are read as part of a broader gendered hierarchy that shapes how the war is justified and understood (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 219–220).

Finally, Sjoberg sketches what she calls a feminist theory of the war in Ukraine. She identifies three main insights: feminist lenses locate “where the women are, where the men are, and where the queer people are” in the conflict, revealing how sex and gender structure vulnerability and resilience; they criticise the gendered logic of coercive, zero-sum policy choices that value domination and victory over compromise and care; and they situate the war within a wider pattern of routine, normalised violence in the international system (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 220). In her conclusion, she argues that the Russia-Ukraine war is best understood as a gendered international security phenomenon, and that feminist IR demonstrates how gender matters at every level of the conflict (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 221). Taken together, these feminist insights suggest that the Russia-Ukraine war should be understood not only as a geopolitical contest but as a deeply gendered security phenomenon in which multiple forms of violence and inequality intersect.

Comparison and Evaluation

Ontologies and levels of analysis

Classical realism and feminist IR begin from different assumptions about what international politics is. For Williams, realism is a theory of how states behave under anarchy: states are the key actors, and their relations can be analysed by looking at power, interests and leaders’ perceptions (Williams, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., pp. 56, 60–63). Sjoberg, by contrast, presents feminist IR as a project that insists that individual lives are global politics, and that gendered hierarchies structure those lives across households, communities and borders (Sjoberg & Tickner, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., pp. 210, 214). In the Russia-Ukraine war, realism therefore centres Russia, Ukraine and NATO as units caught in security dilemmas and status competition (Williams, pp. 68–69), whereas feminism relocates the analysis to civilians, carers, soldiers and LGBTQ+ people, asking how gender and sexuality shape their vulnerability and agency (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 218–220). Where realism foregrounds “high politics” among great powers, feminism treats everyday life as part of world politics.

Conceptions of war and security

The theories also diverge in how they define war and security. For classical realists, security is primarily about state survival; war is a violent clash between states driven by fear, power and the tragic logic of competition (Williams, pp. 57–58, 64–65). The Russia-Ukraine war is thus read as a breakdown of post-Cold War management of the European order, shaped by Russian security concerns, status claims and hubris (Williams, pp. 68–69). Feminist IR widens the lens. Sjoberg argues that security is multidimensional, physical, economic, emotional, cultural, health-related, and often does not coincide with state security (Sjoberg & Tickner, p. 216). War is part of a continuum of violences that extends into homes, workplaces and borders (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 216, 220). In Ukraine this means focusing on displacement, the destruction of infrastructure, conflict-related sexual violence and the gendered burden of care work, which fall unevenly on women, children, the elderly and queer people (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 218–220). Realism explains why a major interstate war could erupt; feminism clarifies what that war does to people.

Knowledge, ethics and responsibility

Epistemologically and ethically, the approaches also differ. Classical realism combines explanation with a concern for prudence in statecraft: leaders must soberly assess power, avoid hubris and manage risks of escalation, especially in a nuclear context (Williams, pp. 64–65, 69–70). In its reading of Ukraine, this underpins debates about how far to support Ukraine while containing the danger of a wider war (Williams, pp. 69–70). Feminist IR adopts a more critical stance towards existing security practices. Sjoberg highlights how apparently neutral concepts such as “security” or “rationality” are infused with gendered assumptions that privilege hegemonic masculinities (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 212–213). Normatively, feminist IR foregrounds structural gendered violence and asks whether policies reproduce or challenge systems of subordination (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 212, 220–221). In Ukraine, this leads to critiques of both Russian and Ukrainian militarisms and to calls for forms of security based on care, cooperation and reduction of violence (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 218–221).

Limits and possible complementarity

Seen together, the approaches reveal each other’s limits. The tensions between realism and feminism echo earlier troubled engagements between feminists and mainstream IR theorists (Keohane, 1989; Tickner, 1997; Weber, 1994). Classical realism offers a powerful account of the strategic dynamics of the war, NATO enlargement, Russian status claims, misperception and hubris (Williams, pp. 57–59, 68–69), but largely sidelines the everyday, gendered harms that feminist IR exposes. Feminist IR, in turn, broadens what counts as war and security and demonstrates how the conflict reshapes gendered hierarchies and everyday life (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 218–221), yet it engages less systematically with questions of geostrategy and military balance that are central to realist analysis.

Rather than treating them as simply opposed, the comparison suggests a potential complementarity: classical realism helps explain how and why a war like that in Ukraine emerges from great-power politics under anarchy, while feminist IR shows who bears its costs and how deeply it is woven into gendered structures of global life. Together, they provide a richer and more critical understanding of the Russia-Ukraine war than either could offer alone.

Conclusion

The Russia-Ukraine war has provided a stark test for international relations theory. This essay has asked how classical realism and feminist IR offer different understandings of the conflict, and what these differences reveal about the limits of each approach. Drawing on Williams’s account of classical realism and its case study of the war, and on Sjoberg’s feminist analysis, the discussion has shown that each theory highlights particular dimensions of the same event while leaving others in the background (Williams, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., pp. 55–57, 68–70; Sjoberg & Tickner, in Dunne et al., 6th ed., pp. 209–211, 217–221).

Classical realism understands the war primarily as an episode in great-power politics under anarchy. It explains the invasion through post-Cold War failures of statecraft, Russian security concerns and status claims, and the hubris of political leadership, and it frames debates about the war’s conduct in terms of prudence, balance of power and the risks of escalation (Williams, pp. 64–65, 68–69). Feminist IR, by contrast, recasts the conflict as a gendered security phenomenon. It brings into view the continuum of violences experienced by civilians, the uneven burdens placed on women, children, the elderly and queer people, and the role of militarised masculinities and gendered discourses in legitimising war (Sjoberg & Tickner, pp. 216–221).

The comparison suggests that neither perspective is sufficient on its own. Realism’s focus on states and strategy yields a compelling account of why and how the war emerged, but it largely sidelines the everyday and gendered dimensions of insecurity that feminist IR reveals. Feminist IR powerfully broadens what counts as war and security, yet it offers a less detailed treatment of the geostrategic calculations that shape the conflict’s trajectory. The Russia-Ukraine war therefore illustrates the value of theoretical pluralism: understanding contemporary world politics requires both attention to power, anarchy and great-power rivalry, and sensitivity to the gendered structures and lived experiences through which those dynamics are enacted.

From my perspective, this suggests that any attempt to theorise the Russia-Ukraine war that ignores either power politics or gendered structures will remain analytically and normatively incomplete.

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